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LEITER TO PARTICIPANTS
Welcome! We are pleased that you are participating in this training program sponsored
by The University of Tennessee's Center for Government Training.
You are to be
commended for your interest in improving your job skills through continuing education.
The field of local government is a challenging one. It requires current job knowledge and
constant skill refinement in order to provide the public with the best service possible. This
training will provide beneficial information and you will leave better equipped to meet the
demands of your position.
In addition to this course, the Center for Government Training offers a variety of programs
and seminars throughout Tennessee for local and state government officials. Two certificate
training programs form the key components of our local government training effort. These
programs are designed specifically for county officials or municipal officials. I encourage
you to learn more about these certificate training programs and to consider what they have
to offer.

Not only do the courses in these programs help to keep you informed about

recent developments, increase your understanding of local government issues and sharpen
your specific job skills, they also provide an opportunity to discuss issues and share ideas
with other local government officials.
The Center for Government Training stresses quality education and practical training to
help you in your daily operations. In order to better serve your needs, we solicit your
input. Your comments and suggestions are important to us. We also welcome your
suggestions on topics for future courses.
Our sincere appreciation is extended to Mr. Jim Murphy, Attorney for the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, who developed the material for
today's course.
Education is a life-long process.
professional development.

We applaud your efforts and your commitment to

Sincerely"

Patricia

C. Davis

Execu tive Director

The Center for GOt'ernment Training ... an agenc: of UT's stateu.'ide public sen.'ice and continuing education organization

LEGAL ISSUES
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I NTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Overview . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Goals

1
1
1

LEGAL FOU N DATIONS FOR
Constitution . . . . . . .
Municipal Charters . .
Public or Private Acts

2
2
3
3

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

MUN ICIPAL GOVERN MENT
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

..
. .
. .
. .

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.

.

STRUCTURE OF MUN I CIPAL GOVERN MENTS . . . . . . . . .
Basic Forms of Municipal Government . . . . . . . . . ..
Municipal Governments Under General Law Charters
Mayor-Aldermanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
Uniform City Manager . .
. .
. . .
.
Modified City Manager-Council . . . . . . . . . . .
Metropolitan Government Charters . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Municipal Governments Under Private Act Charters .
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

. .
.
.
.
.

.

.

. . . . 5
. . .
5
5
. . .
.. . . 5
.
7
11
. . . . . .
14
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . 14
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR M U NICI PAL OFFICIALS . . . . .
Qualifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bribery for Votes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
Oaths of Office . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .
Disclosure Requirements . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Campaign Financial Disclosure Act of 1 980 .. ..
Conflict of Interests Disclosures . . .. . . . . . . . . .
Ouster of Municipal Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
..
. .
. .

ETHICAL CONSI DERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Financial Conflict of Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conflict of Interests Based on Incompatible Offices
Perks and Bribes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

SOURCE A N D EXERCISE OF MUN ICIPAL POWERS . . .
Sources of Municipal Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dillon's Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Delegated Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Police Powers .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .
Exercise of Municipal Powers by Ordinance
Resolutions . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Motions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
..
. .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.

.
.
.

.

.

16
16
17
18
19
19
19
19

. .
. . .
..
. .

23
23
25
25

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
. .
. .
.
.
.
.
.

28
28
28
28
29
30
31
36
37

LIABILITY PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Municipal Liability � ............................... .
Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act . .. . . .. . .
Non-Tort Liability Under State Law . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .

38
38
38
39

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.
.'

Worker's Compensation ......................
Inverse Condemnation ........................
Breach of Contract .. .
.
.
. . . ..
Federal Rights of Actions ....................
Personal Uability .................................

39
39
40
40
40

MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES ..............................
Open Records ................................
Disposition of Records ........................... .
Sunshine Act .................................
.
Federal Fair Labor Standards Act ....................
Exemptions ................................
White Collar Exemptions ......................
Compensable Hours .........................
Breaks
Minimum Wage Provisions .....................
Deductions ................................ .
Overtime .................................
Compensatory Time .........................
Payment for Comp Time ......................
Limitations on the Use of Comp Time ............
Calculating Overtime Pay .....................
Fixed Salary for Fluctuating Hours ................
Determination of the Applicable Workweek or Work
Period ..............................
Occasional or Sporadic Em ployment .
.. . .
Swapping Time .............................
Records ..................................
Enforcement and Penalties .....................

42
42
42
42
43
44
44
45
45
45
45
46
46
46
46
46
47

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

ii

48
48
48
49
49

J

I. INTRODUCTION

.r

Overview

This cou rse in the M u nicipal Offi cials' Certificate Training Program is
desig ned to provide i nformation regarding a broad range of legal issues
which wil l confront municipal officials. A large portion of the course will deal
with the legal foundations for municipal government, the structure of
municipal governments in Tennessee, the powers vested in municipal
governments and the methods for exercising those municipal powers. This
course will also review the basic qualifications for municipal officials as
established by state law and ethical considerations for municipal officia. l s.
This cou rse wil l review issues which confront municipal officials frequently
such as public access to municipal records, open meetings of municipal
offici als, personnel matters and the liability of mu nicipalities and mun icipal
officials under state and federal law.
Lea rning Objectiv es
Goals

Obj ectives

1. Provide municipal officials with
a basic knowledge of the legal
fo u n d ations of m u n icipal
government and operations.

Help municipal officials recogn ize and
respond to legal q uestions and
problems that relate specifically to the
legal
existe nce,
structure and
organization peculiar to their respective
municipal governments.

2. Provide municipal officials with
a basic knowledge of the legal
r e s t r i cti o n s u n d e r w h i c h
municipal governments operate.

Help munici pal officials recogn ize and
respond to restrictions that limit
contemplated municipal action (or
i naction) in their respective mun icipal
governments.

3. Provide mu nicipal officials with
a basic knowledge of legal
requirements and restrictions
applicable to municipal officials.

Help municipal officials recognize,
respond to or avoid legal restrictions
applicable to municipal officials.

4. Provide municipal officials with
a basic knowledge of current
legal issues of concern to
municipalities in general .

Help municipal officials recogn ize and
anticipate legal issues creating concern
in their municipalities before they
become problems in their respective
municipal governments.
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II. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

Constitution
A municipality is a governmental entity created by the Tennessee General
Assembly.1 Although the Tennessee Constitution does not specifically
authorize the General Assembly to create municipalities, there is no doubt
that such power exists.2 The General Assembly may vest a municipality
with such authority as does not violate the federal or state constitutions.3
Municipalities are subject to the control of the General Assembly which can,
at its pleasure, provide for the creation or prohibition of a municipality,
dictate the terms of a municipal charter and confer such powers and duties
and impose such burdens and restrictions as are deemed expedient. 4\
Although the creation of municipalities is not expressly authorized, the
language of Article I I, Section 29 closely indicates that the General Assembly
has the power to establish municipal governments. Article I I, Section 29
empowers the General Assembly to authorize municipalities to levy taxes,
and prohibits municipalities from loaning their credit for private purposes, or
from becoming stockholders as joint owner of any company, association or
corporation for a private purpose without the approval of three-fourths of the
voters.
The legislature governs cities and towns through general laws which apply
to all cities and towns (and sometimes only to all cities and towns within a
certain class, such as all cities and towns of a certain population), and
through private acts which apply only to particular cities and towns. Before
Amendments 6 and 7 of the 1 953 Amendments to the Tennessee
Constitution were adopted, the legislature could (and often did) pass private
acts as well as general laws without consulting with or obtaining the
approval of the affected cities and towns. Neither Amendment 6 nor 7
disturbed the rights of the legislature to pass general laws, but did have a
considerable impact on private acts.
Amendment 6 to the 1 953 Amendments to the Tennessee Constitution
altered the General Assembly's powers over local governments as follows:

(1) Prevented private acts from becoming effective until they obtained

approval by a two-thirds vote of the municipal (or county) governing
body or by the majority of those voting in a referendum held for that
purpose. The private act itself must specify by which of the two
methods local approval can be obtained.

(2) Prohibited entirely private acts "having the effect of removing the

incumbent from any municipal or county office or abridging the term
or altering the salary prior to the end of the term for which such
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public officer is selected." Private acts call "Ripper Bills" had done
those things in many cities and counties without local approval prior
to 1953.
Amendment 7 to the 1953 Amendments to the Tennesse e Constitution, also
known as the home role amendment, altered the powers of the General
Assembly as follows:

(1) Gave municipalities the option of adopting home rule and provided
that the legislature could pass no private act of any kind applying to
home rule municipalities. Home rule cities or towns could then adopt
and amend their own charters without the approval of the legislature.
(2) Prohibited the further incorporation of private act cities and towns and
restricted new incorporation of cities and towns to incorporation
u nder existing or future general laws.
However, Amendment 7 did not disturb the rig ht of existing private act cities
and towns to continue and amend their charters by private acts.
Municipal Charters

The General Assembly has provided for the incorporation of m unicipalities
by the adoption of private act charters (prior to 1953) and the adoption of
general law charters. The charter of a municipal corporation is the
constitution of the local government, granted by the General Assembly, and
the powers granted thereby must be consistent with the Tennessee
Constitution.5
The General Assembly has approved four general act charters.
charters are found in the Tennessee Code Annotated as fol lows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

These

Mayor-Aldermanic Charter (6-1-101 et seg.)
Uniform City Manager-Commission Charter (6- 1 8- 1 01 et seg.)
Modified City Manager-Council Charter (6-30-101 et seg.)
MetropOlitan Government Charter (7-1-101 et seg.)

Private act charters can be located by reference to the volumes of the
Private Acts of Tennessee, which can be found in many law libraries in the
State of Tennessee. All of the various private acts applicable to the
m unicipality must be consulted to ascertain the complete terms of any
private act charter.
Public or Private Acts

As discussed above, the powers and duties of municipalities are subject to
the control of the General Assembly. By the adoption of public acts, the
General Assembly can vest whatever powers it deems appropriate upon
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,

municipalities of the state, or limit or eliminate any powers which were
vested in municipalities by public act, private act or the charter of the
municipality.
The General Assembly is also authorized to adopt private acts applicable to
any particular municipality, but, as discussed above, no such private act
may take affect until it is approved by a vote of 2/3rds of the membership
of the legislative body of the municipality, or approved by a majority of the
votes in a referendum conducted to ascertain the wishes of the voters of the
municipality.
Since the General Assembly is authorized to adopt legislation which can
alter the structure of a municipal government, careful reference to the
Tennessee Code Annotated and the Private Acts of Tennessee applicable
to a municipality must be consulted in order to ascertain the legal foundation
of a municipality government.

1.

Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board v. Lively,
692 S.W.2d 1 5 (Tenn. 1 985).

2.

1 9 Tennessee J urisprudence, Municipal Corporations, S ection 5 , p. 1 23 ( 1 985).

3.

Holly v. City of El izabethton, 1 93 Tenn . 46, 241 S.W.2d 1 00 1 ( 1 951 ).

4.

State v. Frost, 1 03 Tenn. 685, 54 S.W. 986 (1 900).

5.

East Tenn. University v. Mayor of Knoxville, 65 Tenn. 1 66 (1 873).
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III. STRUCTURE OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS

Basic Forms of Municipal Government

There are three basic forms of municipal government in the United States:
(1) Mayor-Council
(a) Strong mayor
(b) Weak mayor
(2) Commission
(3) Council-Manager
The mayor-council form of government must be further subdivided into the
weak mayor type and the strong mayor type. Under the weak mayor type,
the mayor is a weak mayor with few functions beyond that as the
ceremonial head of the municipality and as the presiding officer of the
council. Under the strong mayor type, the mayor has significant operational
functions, including some or all of the following functions: employment and
removal of personnel, budget preparation and execution, supervision and
direction of employees, and veto power. Many mayors run for office without
having learned beforehand whether the office of mayor is a strong or a
weak mayor, and are surprised after taking office that their powers are
extremely limited .
The main characteristic of the commission form of government is that the
members of the municipal legislative body are the heads of municipal
departments. The mayor in the "commissionll form of government is usually
selected by the commissioners from among their membership.
The last basic form of municipal government is the council-manager form.
The major feature of this form of municipal government is that a city
manager appOinted by the city council is the chief administrative officer of
the city. The city manager is directly responsible to the city council for the
operation of the city, and the city manager, rather than the city council or
the mayor, has the authority to appoint, supervise and remove all or most
city employees and to conduct the daily affairs of the city. The mayor
usually has no administrative or executive powers but serves as the
ceremonial head of the city. 1
Munici pal Governments Under General Law Charters
Mayor-Aldermanic. Under the general law mayor-aldermanic charter, the
mayor is a weak mayor. The mayor's legislative authority is limited to the
right to vote on all matters coming before the board of mayor and aldermen.
The administrative authority and duties of the mayor include:
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( 1 ) Taking, information, recommendations and statements of the financial
cond ition of the city before the board.
(2) General supervision of all municipal officers and the right to suspend
any city officers for misconduct or dereliction of duty in office,
provided that a report of such action , including the reasons for it, is
submitted in writing to an immediate meeting of the board .
(3)

M aking temporary appointments for administrative city officers in case
of sickness, absence or other temporary disability under such
restrictions as the board may direct.

(4) Calling special meetings.
(5) Acting as city judge (with jurisdiction concurrent with that of a
sessions court judge) .

(6) CounterSigning all warrants d rawn upon the treasury and municipal
contracts . (6-1-406)
The board of mayor and aldermen is the governing body of the municipality.
As such , it is empowered to exercise the corporate powers of the
munici pality not expressly vested or set out in the duties of some other
official . The board of mayor and aldermen is req uired to read ordi nances
appropriating or receiving money or levying taxes on three separate days,
passing the ordinance on third reading by a majority of the membership of
the board , by calling for a vote of aye or no. All other ordinances must be
read on two separate days. All votes of aye or no on all ordinances must
be recorded. After an ord inance is adopted on final reading, a summary
or caption of the ordinance must be published in a newspaper of general
circu lation. No ordinance shall take affect until this publication occurs.
Also, all ordinances must be codified at least once every ten years .
(Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-2-1 02).
The recorder is appointed by the board of mayor and aldermen. The
charter does not expressly so provide; however, Tennessee Code
Annotated Section 6-1-401 provides that the "officers of each municipality
shall consist of a board of mayor and aldermen", and such offices as they
may deem necessary for the proper administration of municipal affairs .
These officers are to b e selected by the board of mayor and aldermen .
The charter contains two direct references to the recorder.

( 1 ) Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-1 -406 provides that the mayor
"shall countersign all amounts drawn upon the treasurer by the
recorder or secretary . . . "
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(2) Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-2-403 provides that "The
recorder or other properly designated officer shall be vested with
concurrent jurisdiction with Judge of the Court of General Sessions,
in all cases of violation of the criminal laws of the state, or of the
ordinances of the municipality . .. "
It is therefore apparent that the recorder is a position which must be
established under the mayor-alderman charter.
The recorder is subject to the ultimate control of the board of mayor and
alderman under the mayor-aldermanic charter, but the mayor also is vested
with the authority of the "general supervision of all officers of the
municipality... " Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-1-406, this
supervisory authority would include the general supervision of the recorder.
The recorder can apparently be suspended by the mayor pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-1-406 which gives the mayor the
"power to suspend any city officer for misconduct or dereliction of duty in
office ... " But note that the suspension is based on misconduct and
dereliction in office. In addition, the same section provides that the mayor
must report the suspension with the reason in writing to an immediate
special meeting of the board.
Although Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-1-406 provides that the
mayor shall be vested with the powers of a justice of the peace (now a
judge of general seSSions), Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-2-403
provides that the recorder, or other properly designated officer shall be
vested with concurrent jurisdiction with judges of general sessions in all
cases involving the violation of criminal laws of the state or ordinances of the
municipality. These provisions would therefore authorize the mayor or
recorder to serve as the city judge to consider violations of the criminal laws
of the state or ordinances of the municipality.
In addition to the recorder, the charter implies that the municipality operating
under the mayor-aldermanic charter must also have a treasurer. As with the
recorder, the treasurer is appOinted by the board of mayor and aldermen.
The treasurer is responsible for reporting to . the board of mayor and
aldermen at every meeting as to the financial condition of the city, by
providing an itemized accounting of receipts and disbursements, certifying
the availability of funds to the board whenever an order or ordinance
involving the expenditure of money or the creation of a debt shall be
presented to the board of mayor and aldermen, setting aside funds to be
used after any appropriation of money is made by the board of mayor and
aldermen. (Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 6-2-301 and 6-2-307).
Uniform City Manager. The uniform city manager general law charter is
obviously a council-city manager form of municipal government. The mayor
under the general law uniform city manager-commission charter is elected
by the board of commissioners for a two year term (6-22-201). The mayor
is the presiding officer of the board (6-20-209 and 6-20-213), and can call
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special meetings of the board upon g iving each commissioner, the city
manager, recorder, and city attorney twelve ( 1 2) hours writte n notice of the
meeting (6-20-208) . The mayor has a vote on matters presented to the
board, but no veto (6-20-21 3) . Beyond that authority, the charter provides
only that the mayor has the power and duty to "perform all acts that may be
required by any ordinance duly enacted by the board of commissioners, not
i n conflict with any of the provisions of the charterll (6-20-2 1 9) . The mayor
or any other commissioner or employee can be removed from office by the
board of commissioners ''for crimes or misdemeanors i n office , for g rave
misconduct showing unfitness for public duty, or for permanent disability,
by a majority vote of the other members of the board voting for removal."
However, the removal must be accompanied by notice of charges and an
opportunity for a hearing (6-20-220) .
The city manager under the general law uniform city manager-commission
charter, is the administrative head of the city, under the direction and
supervision of the board of commissioners (6-2 1 - 1 07) . The authority and
duties as administrative head of the city are as follows :
( 1 ) To see that the laws and ordinances are enforced , and u pon
knowledge or information of any violation thereof, to see that
prosecutions are instituted in the city court;
(2)

Except as is otherwise set out in the charter, to appoint and remove
all heads of departments and subordinate officers and em ployees, all
appointments to be made upon merit and fitness alone;

( 3) To supervise and control the work of the recorder, the chief of police,
the city attorney, treasurer, and all other officers, and of all
departments and divisions created by the charter or which are
created by the board of commissioners;
( 4) To see that all terms and conditions imposed in favor of the city or
its inhabitants in any public utility or franchise are faithfully done, kept
and performed, and, upon knowledge or information of any violation
thereof, to call the same to the attention of the city attorney;
(5) To attend all meetings of the board of commissioners, with the right
to take part in the discussion , but not to vote;
(6) To recommend to the board of commissioners for adoption such
measures as the city manager may deem necessary or expedient;
(7) To act as budget commissioner and to keep the board of
commissioners fully advised as to the fi nancial condition and need of
the city;
(8) To act as purchasing agent for the city and to purchase all material ,
supplies and equipment for the proper conduct of the city's business.
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The board of commissioners shall prescribe by ordinance the
maximum expenditure which the city manager may m ake without
specific authorization of the board , and shall prescribe rules for
competitive bidding, but no purchase shall be made at any one time
in an amount which in the aggregate will exceed one thousand
dollars ($ 1 ,000) , unless bids shall have been requested through
advertisement and award made to the lowest bidder; and
(9) To perform such other duties as may be prescri bed by the charter
or required of him by resolution or ordinance of the board of
com missioners (6-2 1 -1 08) .
The charter further provides that the city manager appoints the police and
fire chiefs and such other mem bers of the police and fire departments "as
may be provided by ordi nance" (6-2 1 -70 1 ) , and that the city manager may
appoint or remove the recorder, chief of police, treasurer, city attorney and
all other officers, agents , and employees (6-2 1 - 1 02) .
An additional element of the city manager's authority and duties is that he
has the "fu ll power to manage and control the pu blic or the city schools
(6-2 1 - 1 08) , and , in accordance with that authority and duty, has broad
personnel power over the school superintendent and other school
employees (6-2 1 -802) , and over the erection and maintenance of school
buildings and the purchase of school equipment and supplies (6-2 1 -803
and 6-21 -804) .
The city manager is appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of, the board
of commissioners except that the city manager cannot be removed from
office withi n twelve months of appointment except for incom petence,
malfeasance, non performance or neglect of duty . Removal with in twelve
months gives the city manager the rig ht to demand writte n charges and a
public heari ng prior to the removal (6-2 1 - 1 0 1 ) . This twelve month protection
was obviously designed to allow the city manager a period of time to
operate the affairs of the municipality without threats of removal from the
board of com missioner, who disapprove of the management activities of the
city manager.
The board of comm issioners is the legislative body vested with the
legislative powers and all other governmental powers of the mu nici pality
except as otherwise provided in the charter (6-20-205) . The board selects
the mayor who presides over the meeti ngs of the board . The board also
selects the vice mayor to act for the mayor when the mayor is absent or
unable to act. The powers of the board must be exercised in the sessions
duly assem bled , with the sessions open to the pu blic (6-20-206, 6-20-2 1 2) .
A majority of all the members of the board shall constitute a quorum which
is needed to take action by the board (6-20-2 1 0) . All ordinances of the
board must beg in with the phrase "Be it ordained by the city of
as
follows:", must be read on three different days and not less than one week
shall e lapse between first and third reading (6-20-21 4 , 6-20-21 5) . All
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ordinances except emergency ordinances shall not take effect until fifteen
days after the first passage thereof. Emergency ordinances m ust contain
a statement that an emergency exists and specify in detail the facts and
reasons constituting the emergency, and shall be adopted only upon the
u nanimous vote of the board. An emergency ordinance shall take effect
u pon the day of its final passage (6-20-2 1 5) .
The votes of the board on all ordinances shall be by yeas and nays, with the
vote of each member voting for or against an ordinance being entered into
the journal (6-20-2 1 6) .
Each ordinance which is adopted shall be
numbered, copied in an ordinance book and filed and preserved by the
recorder (6-20-2 1 7) . Ordinances or a caption and summary thereof must
be published i n a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality before
they become effective (6-20-2 1 8) .
U nder the uniform city manager-commission charter, the recorder is
appointed by the city manager and may be removed by the city manager
at any time (6-2 1 - 1 0 1 ) . The recorder may apparently be removed by the
board of commissioners u nder Tennessee Code Annotated Section
6-20-220 which provides that:
The mayor or any commissioner or any employee may be removed from
office by the board of commissioners for crime or misdemeanor in office,
for grave misconduct showing unfitness for public duty, or for permanent
disability by a majority vote of the other members of the board voting for
such removal.

However, removal under this section also g ives the accused certain
elaborate rights including specific written charges and a hearing.
The authority, duties and responsibilities of the city recorder u nder the
uniform city manager-commission charter are principally contained in
Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-21 -40 1 through 6-2 1 -405. The
recorder has a seat and voice, but no vote, on the board of commissioners,
(6-21 -40 1 ) , heads the department of finance, (6-21 -40 1 ) , attends and keeps
a record of all meetings of the board of comm issioners, (6-21 -403) , has the
custody of and preserves all municipal records (6-2 1 -404) and performs any
of the duties imposed by the charter or by ordinance (6-2 1 -401 ) .
The city manager has the authority to appoint the recorder as the treasurer
(6-22-1 1 9) . Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-22- 1 0 1 describes in
explicit detail the fiscal duties and responsibilities of the recorder as head of
the department of finance. The work of the recorder is done under the
supervision and control of the city manager (6-2 1 - 1 08) . In add ition , the
recorder serves as city judge where the office has not been filled by the
appointment of another person by the board of commissioners (6-2 1 -50 1 ) .
I n a few mu nicipalities as identified by population classes, the city judge has
jurisdiction concurrent with that of the courts of general sessions, and in
these mu nicipalities the city judge must be an attorney , must be appointed
by the board of commissioners and serves at the wil l of the board
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(6-2 1 -501 ). 2 In the remaining municipalities, the city judge has jurisdictio n
only over those cases arising under municipal ordinances and laws. The
qualifications for the city judge, if one is appointed by the board , must be
specified in an ordinance adopted by the board . The duties of the city
judge and the operation of the city court under the uniform city
manager-commission charter are set out in considerable detail in
Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 6-2 1 -502 through 6-2 1 -508.
The appointment of a city attorney is not expressly required under the
uniform city manager-commission charter, however the charter does
contemplate such an official, since Tennessee Code Annotated Section
6-2 1 - 1 02 provides for the qualifications of the city attorney, and Tennessee
Code Annotated Section 6-2 1 -202 provides for the duties of the city
attorney. The city attorney is under the supervision of the city m anager,
who can also remove the city attorney at any time (6-21 - 1 08, 6-2 1 - 1 02) .
The uniform city manager-commission charter also provides for the
establishment of a department of finance under the recorder (6-2 1 -40 1 ) ,
and departments of public safety, public works , welfare and education
(6-2 1 -30 1 ) . These departments and other departments as created by
ordinance are under the supervision and control of the city manager
(6-21 -302, 6-2 1 -303) .
The charter also provides for the appointment by the city m anager of a chief
of police and other members of the police force as are provided for by
ordinance to perform the duties set out at Tennessee Code Annotated
Section 6-2 1 -602 (6-2 1 -60 1 ). The city manager is req uired to appoint a
chief of the fire department and other members as may be provided by
ordinance so as to prevent and su ppress fires (6-2 1 -70 1 , 6-2 1 -702) . The
city manager must also appoint and establish the salary and duties of the
superintendent of education and all teachers and other person nel of the
department of education (6-2 1 -802) . The city manager is also authorized to
appoint a treasurer, however the recorder may be appointed as treasurer
(6-22- 1 1 9).
Mod i f i e d
C ity
Ma n ag e r-C ou n cil.
As with the u n ifo rm
city-manager-commissioner form, the modified city manager-council form of
municipal government is a counCil-manager form of government.

The mayor under the modified city manager-cou ncil charter is elected by
the council (6-32- 1 06) . The mayor is the ceremonial head of the city and
signs ordinances and other city docu ments (6-32- 1 06) . The mayor also
has the authority, as do the city manager and any of the council members,
to call special meetings of the council (6-32-1 02) . However, the mayor
"shall not have any regular administrative duties, and shall perform only
such duties as shall be - specifically conferred or required by law.
(6-32-1 06).
II

The city manager is the administrative head of the city, responsible for
carrying out the policies of the city council under the general law modified
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city manager-council charter. The council must deal with the administrative
officers and employees of the city solely through the city manager "except
for the purpose of inquiry." In other words, the council cannot give orders
to the city manager's subordinates or interfere with the city manager's
administration of the city (6-35-703) .
The city manager's specific authority and duties include:
(1) Law enforcement and public safety and health (6-35-204) .
(2)

Purchasing (6-35-205)

(3)

Management of all city property (except school property). (6-35-301)

(4) Collection of taxes (6-35-301) .
(5) Administration of finances (6-35-302) .
(6) Budget preparation and administration (6-35-304, 6-35-310) .
(7) AppOintment, removal and supervision of all city personnel, subject
to a merit system for which the city manager is also responsible
(6-35-402, 6-35-406) .
(8) Compensation of city officers and employees (6-35-407) .
However, unlike the general law uniform city manager-commission charter,
an elected school board, and not the city manager, is responsible for the
operation of the school system (6-36-101) . The council elects the mayor
and who presides over the meeting of the council (6-32-106) . The council
also elects a mayor pro tem to act in the absence of the mayor
(6-32-107) . The council must hold regular meetings twice monthly and may
hold special meetings upon the request of the mayor, the city manager or
any two council members (6-32-101, 6-32-102) . The council must exercise
its powers only at public meetings (6-32-103) , and at least one half of the
membership of the council constitutes a quorum necessary for the council
to conduct business (6-32-104) . The council has the power to compel
attendance at its meetings by council members or other city officials
(6-32-105) . The affirmative vote at one-half of the membership of the
council is necessary to appoint or remove any official, but any other action
except for calling a special meeting or adjourning a meeting may be
accomplished by a vote of a majority of those members present and
constituting a quorum (6-32-108) . The vote on any proposed ordinance
must be by yea or nay, with the vote of each council member entered into
the journal which must be maintained for all proceedings of the council
(6-32-108) . A summary of all proceedings of the council shall be published
within fifteen days after the.. meeting in a newspaper of general circulation
which has been designated as the official city newspaper (6-32-108,
6-33-112) . The council 'is also authorized to subpoena and examine
witnesses, order the production of books and papers, and punish witnesses
for contempt (6-32-109) .
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All regulatory or penal action, revenue measures, or other action required
by the charter to be accomplished by ordinance, may only be accomplished
by the adoption of an ordinance. The ordinance must encompass only one
subject which shall be expressed in its title. The enacting clause of any
ordinance must state: "Be it ordained by the Mayor and Councilmen of the
(6-32-201). Other actions may be accomplished by motion
City of
or resolution. All ordinances, motions or resolutions considered by the
council must be in written form prior to their introduction (6-32-201).
All ordinances shall be read at two meetings not less than one week apart,
and except for emergency ordinances, shall take effect ten days after the
adoption. Emergency ordinances which contain a full statement of facts
and reasons for the emergency, may be made effective upon their adoption
if approved by a majority of the members of the council on two readings, on
successive days. The title and brief summary of all ordinances except
emergency ordinances must be published in the official city newspaper at
least one week before final passage (6-32-202). Any ordinance granting a
permit or right to use public property for any purpose or granting a
franchise or exclusive contact must remain on file with the clerk for public
inspection for at least two weeks prior to its final adoption (6-32-203).
All ordinances must be maintained in the "ordinance book" by the clerk with
a separate book for all resolutions, and at least an abstract of all essential
proviSions of each ordinance shall be published in the official city
newspaper within ten days of its adoption (6-32-204). Also, all ordinances
must be codified within one year of the adoption of the charter and every
ten years thereafter (6-32-205).
There is no reference to a recorder in the modified city manager-council
charter. However, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-35-401 provides
that the city manager "shall" appoint a city clerk responsible for keeping and
preserving the city seal, and all records of the council; attending meetings
of the council and keeping a journal of proceedings at such meetings;
preparing and certifying copies of official records in the clerk's office and
performing all other duties as are prescribed by the council or city manager.
The clerk may be removed by the city manager under Tennessee Code
Annotated Section 6-35-402, but it must be done in accordance with the
merit system outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 6-35-403
through 6-35-411.
The general law modified city manager-council charter requires that the city
judge be a licensed attorney and be elected by popular vote for a four-year
term. The city council fills vacancies in the office of city judge between
elections. The city judge has jurisdiction concurrent with that of judges of
courts of general session (6-33-102). While the city council "shall by
ordinance establish and provide for the administration of a city court, the
city judge has broad personnel authority over the city court employees
(6-33-102, 6-33-103).
II
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The charter also requires the council to create a personnel advisory board
and authorizes the creation of other such advisory boards, with the council
to prescribe in each case the number of members, apPointment, length of
term, and advisory duties of these boards (6-33-1 05) . The council is also
required to establish a planning commission to exercise the authority in the
fields of planning, zoning and subdivision control as set forth under the
general laws of the state (6-33-1 06) .
The council is also required to appoint a city attorney and such assistant
city attorneys as the council determines to be required (6-33-1 1 3) . The
duties of the city attorney are set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated
Section 6-33- 1 1 3 (b) .
The charter also provides for the establish ment of a three member
eq ualization board by the council to review tax assessments made upon
property within the city (6-34- 1 01 , 6-34-1 02) .
Metropolita n Govern ment Charte rs

The provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7- 1 -1 01 , et seg. ,
which authorize the creation of consolidated city-county governments into
a metropolitan government, permit the charter commissioner which drafts
the charter for the metropolitan govern ment to set forth the appropriate
structure for the metropolitan government (7-2- 1 0 1 ) .
The required
com ponents of the charter of such a metropolitan govern ment are set forth
at Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-2-1 03.
Mun icipa l Govern ments Under Private Act Charters

It is difficult to speak with precision about the authority and duties of
municipal officials under private act charter because each charter varies to
some extent. For example, under some private act charters, the mayor is
a strong mayor who exercises considerable ad ministrative authority,
including the veto power over ordinances. Under other private act charters,
the mayor is a weak mayor whose only authority beyond that exercised by
other city cou ncil members is the authority to preside over council meetings,
act as the ceremonial head of the city and perhaps make temporary
appointments to city offices . Even the city manager under some private act
charters does not have all the authority traditionally granted to city
managers under most city manager-council forms of government, or the
charter authorizes the city council to limit or expand the authority of the city
manager at its pleasure. Since each private act charter is a separate and
distinct document, close scrutiny of the entire charter is necessary to deter
mine the structure of the municipality created by such a private act charter.
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See Forms of Municipal Government (The Bureau of P u bl ic Ad m inistration, The
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, October 1 973); Tennessee Municipal Hand book
Fourt h Edition (Municipal Technical Advisory Service, The University of Te nnessee,
1987) .
2

See Summers v. Thompson, 764 S .W. 2d 1 82 (Tenn. 1988) . The Sup reme Court
held that only city judges who d id not exercise constitutional jud icial power served
at the will of the board.
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IV.

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS

Qualifications

The general qualification requirements for officeholders apply to mu nicipal
officeholders. These general qualifications permit the holding of office by all
persons over the age of eighteen years ' who are citizens of the United
States and Tennessee, and who reside within and are qualified voters of the
state, county, district, or circuit for the period required by law, 2 are qualified
to hold office, except:
1.

Those convicted of offering or g iving a bribe, or larceny, or any other
offense declared i nfamous by law, unless those persons have been
restored to citizenshi p;

2.

Those against whom there is an unpaid judgment for moneys
received by them in an official capacity, due to the United States,
Tennessee, or any county;

3.

Those who are defau lters to the treasury at the time of election (such
an election is void) ;

4.

Soldiers, seamen, mari nes, airmen , in the regular United States Navy,
Army , or Air Force ; and

5.

Members of Co ngress and persons holding any office of profit or
trust under any foreign power, other state, or the United States.
(8-1 8-1 0 1 )

A crime declared infamous by law is a felony, or a crime which is partially
punishable by disenfranchisement ( loss of the right to vote) . Also, any
person previously convicted of a misdemeanor in office (39-5-401 m �.) ,
is forever barred from holding office . Any disqualified person who takes
office is guilty of a misdemeanor. (8- 1 8- 1 02)
I n addition to these general qualifications, munici pal officials under the
mayor-aldermanic charter must comply with the requirements of Tennessee
Code Annotated Sections 6-1 -40 1 and 6-1 -402, municipal officials under the
uniform city manager-commissioner charter must comply with the
requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 6-20-1 0 1 , 6-20-1 03
and 6-20- 1 04, and municipal officials under the modified city
manager-council charter must comply with the requirements of Tennessee
Code Annotated Sections 6.:.3 1 - 1 0 1 and 6-3 1 - 1 05. Municipal officials under
the metropolitan govern ment charter and private act charters must comply
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with whatever qualification requirements for mu nicipal officeholders which
are contained in those charters.
It is unlawful for any candidate for the election to a
municipal office to expend, pay, promise, loan , or become pecu niarily liable
in any way for money or any other thing of value, either directly or indirectly,
or to ag ree to enter into any contract with any person to vote for or support
any particular policy or measure, in consideration of the vote or support,
moral or financial, of such person (2-1 9-1 21 ) . This is the prohibition against
bribery for votes (2-1 9-1 26) . However, this does not render it illegal to
make expenditures to employ clerks or stenographers in a campaign, for
pri nting and advertising, for actual travel expenses, or for certain other
allowed expenditures (2-1 9-1 24) . Voters l ikewise are prohibited from
accepting bribes, and betting on elections is also prohibited (2-1 9-1 29
through 2- 1 9- 1 3 1 ) . There are also prohi bitions on bribery for votes found
in the uniform city manager-commission charter, (6-20- 1 08) and the
modified city manager-council charter (6-3 1 - 1 09) .
Bribery for Votes .

In a case i nvolving whether the district attorney abused his d iscretion in
refusing to bring a quo warranto proceeding against the Mayor of
Nashville-Davidson County as requested by an unsuccessful candidate for
that office, 3 the Tennessee Supreme Court considered the question of
bri bery in violation of the bribery statutes and Article 1 0, Section 3 of the
Tennessee Constitution, which states:
Any elector who shall receive any gift o r reward for his vote, in meat, drink,
money or otherwise, shall suffer such punishment as the law shall direct.
And any person who shall directly or indirectly give, promise or bestow any
such reward to be elected, shall thereby be rendered incapable, for six
years, to serve in the office for which he was elected, and be subject to
such further punishment as the Legislature shall direct.

The allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the Mayor involved distribution
of free cheese and butter to low income g roups through the Metropolitan
Development and Housing Agency, and a barbecue and watermelon feast
sponsored by the Mayor's re-election committee.
In rejecting the bribery claim, the Supreme Court held :
A quo warranto proceeding is not maintainable at the instance of a private
citizen. (citation omitted). However, if the District Attorney should act
arbitrarily or capriciously or should be guilty of a palpable abuse of his
discretion in declining to bring such action or in authorizing its institution,
the Courts will take jurisdiction upon relation of a private citizen, in the
name of the State of Tennessee. ' (citation omitted). The burden of proof
Is on the party having the affirmative of an issue and this burden never
shifts. (citation omitted). The burden of proving that the District Attorney
acted arbitrarily or capriciously or was guilty of palpable abuse in
declining to proceed is upon the private citizen who seeks to rectify the
alleged public wrong without approval of the District Attorney General.
The prohibition of the Constitution and the statute involved here is directed
to the giving or promising of rewards such as meat, drink, money, or things
of value for a vote to be elected to public office. Ms. Anderson and her
17

attorney did not provide the District Attorney with a single instance wherein
it was factually asserted that Mayor Fulton had given anything of value in
exchange for a promise to vote for him in the Mayoral election. Implicit In
the District Attorney General's letter of May 1 7 was the observation that the
serving of food at a traditional political rally promoting a candidate for
election to public office, to which the general public is invited, lacks the
essential element of bribery, to-wit: that a voter is given food in exchange
for his vote, which element was also not present in the distribution of butter
and cheese.

Oaths Qf Office

M unicipal officeholders under the mayor-aldermanic charter, the u niform
city manager-corTlmission charter, metropolitan government charter or
private act charters which do not specify the content of the oath for
municipal officials must take oaths to support the constitutions of
Te nnessee and the U n ited States (required by Article 1 0 , Section 1 ,
Te nnessee Constitution) and for the faithful performance of the duties of the
office. These oaths are :
.,,
' do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of
this State and of the United States.
•

., do solemnly swear that I will perform with fidelity the duties of the office
to which I have been elected (or appointed, as the case may be) and
which I am about to assume. ·
(8- 18- 1 1 1)

These oaths may be administered by any officer legally authorized to
ad minister an oath , wh ich generally includes notaries, judges, and clerks.
The oath must be written and subscribed to by the person taking it. A
certificate must accompany the oath , executed by the officer taking the
oath . It must specify the day and the year the oath was taken (8- 1 8-1 07) .
The oath must be filed in the archives of the city u nder the
mayor-aldermanic charter (6- 1 -404) ; with the recorder under the uniform
city manager-commission charter (6-2 1 - 1 03) ; or in the office desig nated by
the metropolitan government charter or private act charter.
M u nicipal officials under the modified city manager-council charter must
take the following oath :
., solemnly swear (or affirm) that I possess all the qualifications prescribed
for the office (or position) of
, as prescribed by this charter,
and that I will, in all respects, observe the provisions of the charter and
, and that I will faithfully discharge the
ordinances of the city of
duties of the office (or position) of
•

�

A copy of th is oath must be filed i n the office of the city clerk (6-31 - 1 1 2) .
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Disclosure Requirements

Certain requirements
relative to campaign contributions and expenditures apply to elected
municipal officials. Contributions can be loans, loan security, promises, or
other obligations, whether or not legally enforceable, but do not include
volunteer services, nonpartisan activities designed to encourage persons to
vote, the use of real or personal property, and the cost of i nvitations, food ,
and beverages not exceeding $ 1 00, voluntarily provided at an individual's
residence . Each cand idate for local public office must file with the county
election commission a statement that neither receipts nor expenditures
exceeded $ 1 000, or an itemized statement showing total contributions
received and expenditures , with amounts over $ 1 00 itemized . These
disclosures must be filed not l ater than seven days before a primary election
and a general election . A statement covering dates from that report, and
the next 45 days, is due 48 days after the election (2- 1 0- 1 0 1 et �) .
Campaign Financial Disclosure Act of 1 980.

Conflict of Interests Disclosures . Candidates or appointees to municipal

offices which are filled by a vote of the public are required to file conflict of
interests disclosure statements with the county election commission within
ten days after the qualifying deadline for the election. Persons appointed
to such a municipal office must also file the disclosure statement within 20
days after the appoi ntment (8-50-50 1 .e1 �) . These forms are available
in the cou nty election commission office and are prescribed by the
Secretary of State . These forms are also required to be filed by the above
mentioned municipal officials each year by January 1 5th. If no information
on the previous year's statement has changed , the county election
co mmission may be notified that none of the information has changed.
Failure to file these disclosure forms is punishable by a fine of up to $ 1 000.
These forms, once filed, are public records.
Ouster of Mun icipal Officials

Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8-47- 1 0 1 provides that municipal
officials may be ousted from office for:
1.

Knowingly or willfully engaging in misconduct while in office ;

2.

Knowingly or willingly neglecting to perform duties required by law;

3.

Being intoxicated in a public place ;

4.

Engaging in gambling ; or

5.

Committ ing any ae! ' violating any penal statute involving moral
turpitude.

Deciding what is a crime involving moral turpitude must be made on a case
by case determination . Generally, a crime involving moral turpitude involves
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a crime that reflects upon the moral fitness of a person, such as a crime
involving dishonesty, murder, sale of drugs, and possibly, any crime
involving intentional and serious bodily harm to others. Many of the cases
involving determinations of whether crimes are ones of moral turpitude are
those involving fitness for the granting of a license, such as a beer permit.
For instance, the case of Gibson v. Ferguson" involved the question of a
person's fitness for a beer permit. The case held that the offense of Itrolling
high dice for a Coke", and the offense of failing to immediately release
seventeen bluegill fish, were not crimes of mora.l turpitude.
In addition to these grounds for removal, the criminal statutory provisions
provide grounds, other than those in an ouster suit, for removal of public
officials. Any official who is convicted of a misdemeanor relative to the
operation of his or her office will be punished, in addition to the criminal
Examples of
punishment for the offense, by removal from office.
misdemeanors in office are neglect of duty (39-9-402) , drunkenness,
preventing proper discharge of the duties of office (39-5-403) , and receiving
a greater commission than legally allowed (39-5-406) . Persons removed
from office under these provisions are forever disqualified from holding
office in the state (39-5-401) .5 Generally, an official cannot be removed for
a misdemeanor offense not a crime of moral turpitude and not a
misdemeanor in office.
Ouster proceedings are civil proceedings and may be instituted by the
attorney general, district attorney general, county or city attorney, who may
institute such ouster proceedings on their own initiative. It is the duty of
these attorneys to investigate all written complaints of misconduct by an
official in their jurisdiction. If after investigation, the attorney decides
reasonable grounds for the complaint exist, that attorney should institute
court proceedings (8-47-103) .
Citizens may also file ouster proceedings (8-47-110) . Ten citizens and
freeholders are required to institute such proceedings, posting security for
the costs of the lawsuit, and, upon request by the citizens, the attorneys
named above must provide assistance to these citizens (8-47-107) . Upon
a finding of good cause, an official may be suspended from office by the
judge pending the final hearing of the case (8-47-117) . If a municipal official
is suspended, a vacancy is created, which is filled as any other vacancy.
Either party to an ouster proceeding may appeal to the Tennessee Supreme
Court. Such an appeal will not operate to suspend or vacate the trial
court's judgment or decree, which remains in force until vacated, revised,
or modified by the Supreme Court (8-47-123) .
A municipal official who successfully defends an ouster suit will be restored
to office, will be allowed court costs, and will be paid the salary of the office
during the time of any suspension (8-47-121) .6 Persons filling an office
during a suspension receive the same compensation as that of the regular
officeholder.
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A conflict of interests violation (1 2-4- 1 0 1 ) can also result in a municipal
official being ousted and ineligible to hold office for ten years.

Attorney General's Opinion 84-203 dated J u ne 21 , 1 984 regard ing having the
birthday required to qualify for an office twelve days after the election.
2

3

Attorney General's Opi nion 86-03 dated January 1 4, 1 986 relative
defi nitions of the terms "residents" and "citizens".
State ex reI . Anderson v. Fulton, 71 2 S.W.2nd 90 (Ten n . 1 986) .
Gibson v. Ferguson, 562 S.W.2d 1 88 (Tenn. 1 976) .

5

e

Attorney General's Opinion 85-263 dated October 1 8, 1 985.
Marshall v. Sevier Cou nty, 639 S.W.2d 440 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 982) .
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V.

ETH I CAL CONSI DERATIONS

Financial Conflict of Interests

The general law municipal govern ment charters contain provisions
regulating financial conflict of interests which confront municipal officials who
approve, overlook or superintend any municipal work or contract. (6-2-402,
6-20-205 (b) , 6-35-4 1 2) . Municipal officials under metropolitan government
or private act charters are subject to any conflict of interests provisions
contained in the charter for the municipality.
In addition to these conflict of interests statutes, municipal officials are
subject to the basic conflict of interests statute, Tennessee Code Annotated
Section 1 2-4- 1 01 , which states :
It shall not be lawful for any officer, committeeman, director, or other
person whose duty it is to vote for, let out, overlook, or in any manner to
superintend any work or any contract in which any municipal corporation,
county, state, development district, utility districts, human resource
agencies, and other political subdivision created by statute shall or may
be interested, to be directly interested in any such contract. -Directly
interested- means any contract with the official himself or with any business
in which the official is the sole proprietor, a partner, or the person having
the controlling interest. -Controlling interesr shall include the individual
with the ownership or control of the largest number of outstanding shares
owned by any single individual or corporation.
It shall not be lawful for any officer, committeeman, director, or other
person whose duty it is to vote for, let out, overlook, or in any manner to
superintend any work or any contract in which any municipal corporation
county, state, development districts, utility districts, human resource
agencies, and other political subdivisions created by statute shall or may
be interested, to be indirectly interested in any such contract unless the
officer publicly acknowledges his interest. -Indirectly interested- means
any contract in which the officer is interested but not directly so, but
includes contracts where the officer is directly interested but is the sole
supplier of goods or services in a municipality or county.

First, it is interesting to note that the statute only prohibits conflict of
interests when the municipal official has a financial interest and will be voting
for, overlooking, letting out, or in some manner superintending the work or
contract. For example, a municipal official could probably bid on providing
ambulance service for the municipality if that municipal official would not be
voting for or overlooking such contract in any manner. The penalty for
violation is as follows:
Should any person, acting as such officer, committeeman, director, or
other person referred to /in 12-4- 10 1, be or become directly or unlawfully
indirectly interested in any such contract, he shall forfeit all pay and
compensation therefor. ' Such officer shall be dismissed from such office
he then occupies, and shall be ineligible for the same or similar position
for ten (10) years. (12-4- 102)
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The above statute only prohibits pecuniary interests. If a municipal official
receives no direct pecuniary interest, but is interested in a contract from
another standpoint, that interest would not be prohibited, so long as the
municipal official gained no personal financial benefit from the contract. An
example would a rnunicipal official hiring a friend to work for the
municipality. Since the municipal official would gain no financial benefit, no
prohibited conflict of interests exists.
The question often arises as to whether it is proper for a municipal official
to have authority on a matter that will have a direct financial benefit to a
relative, such as purchasing copying equipment from a nephew. The
question becomes more complex when the person who will receive the
direct financial benefit is the spouse of a municipal official . The Attorney
General has opined that if the spouses commingle assets, a member of a
legislative body voting on the budget of the board of education which
employees the spouse of the legislative board member has an indirect
conflict of interest and must publicly acknowledge the conflict (and also
recuse himself from voting on the matter, which was then required by
statute for an indirect conflict of interests). If the spouses do not commingle
assets, it was the opinion of the Attorney General that the board member
should recuse himself as a matter of public policy.
The disclosure of indirect interests is required by the statute which calls for
"public acknowledgement" of such interests. What is necessary for public
acknowledgment is unclear, especially in the context of an official such as
the city manager who does not have an opportunity to acknowledge such
conflict when the legislative body votes on the matter. Municipa.l officials
should therefore be careful in indirect conflict of interest situations to provide
public notice of these interests prior to taking any action. For example, if a
municipal official purchases supplies from a corporation in which he or she
owns a small minority (not plurality) interest, this rnust be disclosed publicly.
As the municipal official may lack a natural public forum for such disclosure,
some form of written public notice, via bulletin boards in the courthouse or
other public place and notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality, might be appropriate.
It is important to note that none of the conflict of interests statutes make any
distinction based on amount of money involved. Therefore, any direct
financial interest is prohibited. However, the Attorney General has indicated
that a significant interest might be required, as opposed to a de minimus
interest . Since it would be very difficult to determine what court might hold
to be significant, and since the penalty for violation of the conflict of
interests statute is so severe, municipal officials would be well advised to
consider any interest as significant.
1

In addition to the basic conflict of interests provision, municipal officials are
also subject to the conflict of interests prohibition found at Tennessee Code
Annotated Section 6-54-107, which states as follows:
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No person holding office under any municipal corporation shall, during the
time for which he was elected or appointed, be capable of contracting with
such corporation for the performance of any work which is to be paid for
out of the treasury. Nor shall such person be capable of holding or having
any other direct interest in such a contract. -Direct interesr means any
contract with any business in which the official Is the sole proprietor, a
partner, or the person having the controlling Interest. -Controlling interesr
shall include the individual with the ownership of control of the largest
number of outstanding shares owned by any single individual or
corporation.
No officer in a municipality shall be indirectly interested in any contract to
which the municipality shall be indirectly interested in any contract to
which the officer is interested but not directly so, but includes contracts
where the officer is directly interested but is the sole supplier of goods or
services in a municipality.

Conflict of Interests Based on Incompatible Offices
Municipal employees, otherwise qualified, are authorized to serve on the
municipal le � islative body unless expressly prohibited by the charter of the
municipality.
However these municipal officials, while serving on the
municipal legislative body, must cOrTlply with the aforementioned conflict of
interests provisions by abstaining from voting on the budget of the
department or agency in which he or she is employed, or in any manner in
which he or she is directly interested.3 The Attorney General has also
opined that such a municipal legislative body member must abstain from
voting when the member has an indirect conflict of interest, even though
amendments to the municipal conflict of interests statute would seem to
permit such voting by such a member of the legislative body. 4
Although not expressly prohibited by the municipal charter, a municipal
official cannot hold two incompatible municipal offices. � The determination
of incompatibility is based on whether the occupancy of both offices by the
same person is detrimental to the public interest, or whether the
performance of the duties of one interferes with the performance of those
of the other. In State ex reI. v. Thompson,6 the court held that a member
of the board of commissioners could not also serve as city manager
because the board of commissioners determined whether the city manager
could be discharged, or whether to accept, reject, or modify the
recommendations of the city manager and di rected and supervised the city
manager in the administration of the city. 7

Perks and Bribes
The Tennessee Constitution and general law prohibits offering bribes for
votes. Generally, it is also a crirTl inal offense for any elected official to
accept any bribe (39-5-104). The Constitution and statutes prohibit offering
bribes for votes. 8 Bribery, as commonly understood, is the act of giving or
receiving a gift for the purpose of affecting the improper discharge of a
public duty. A "kickback" is a bribe involving the payment of money or
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property to an individual for causing the county to buy from, to use the
services of, or to deal otherwise with, the person making the payment. A
kickback is often viewed as a specific inducement for a particular sale, or
as a reward for accomplishing a particular purpose.
Bribery is a felony and any municipal official convicted for bribery will be
punished by imprisonment for not less than three nor more than 21 years.
Persons convicted of attempting to bribe a public official will also be subject
to punishment. The law that applies to municipal officials states:
Any executive, legislative, or judicial officer who corruptly accepts, or
agrees to accept, any gift or gratuity, or thing of value, or any promise to
make any gift, or do any act beneficial to such officer, under an agreement
or with an understanding that his vote, opinion, or judgment is to be given
in any particular manner, or upon any particular side of any question or
proceeding which is, or may by law be brought, before him in his official
capacity, or that, in such capacity, he is to make any particular
appointment, shall, on conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the
penitentiary for not less than three (3) nor more than twenty-one (2 1) years.
(39-5- 103)

The classic kickback situation, on a municipal level , involves a municipal
official who is approached by a sales agent and is offered 1 0% of the
pu rchase price if the municipality purchases his equipment. The official is
influential in the subsequent purchase of the equipment and receives his
"cut". Both parties are guilty of bribery. It does not matter which party
initiated the illegal transaction. Further, if the municipal official solicited the
kickback, the municipal official would be guilty of bribery regardless of
whether the sales agent agreed to pay the bribe. Whi le bribery in terms of
money is the most freq uent and the most prosecuted form, other business
practices that involve the g ivi ng of other amenities must be carefully
scrutinized .
Perks, which are usually small benefits that have no promise to act in any
manner connected with them , are not a violation of the general law.
However, as the difference between a perk and a bribe can be a subtle
difference in intent, the mu nicipal official should be carefu l in accepting gifts
or other benefits . It is possible that gratuities or perks, such as free food,
lodging , and transportation g iven to a municipal official by private parties
with whom the official conducts municipal business may be considered a
bribe. The g reater the value of the perk or gratu ity, the more difficult it
would be to overcome the public's idea that ''you don't get something for
noth ing".

25

Attorney General 's Opinion 84-67 dated February 1 6 , 1 984.
2

3

Attorney General's Opin ion 87-66 dated April 1 3, 1 987; Attorney General 's Opinion
U87 -78 dated July 28, 1 987.
Attorney General's Opinion 87-66 dated April 1 3 , 1 987 .
Attorney General's Opinion 88- 1 22 dated July 1 3, 1 988; Attorney General's Opinion
87-66 dated April 1 3, 1 987 .

5

8
7

8

State ex reI . v. Thompson, 1 93 Tenn. 395 , 246 S.W. 2d 59 (1 952) ; Attorney
General's Opinion 84-209 dated June 27, 1 984 ; Attorney General's Opinion U-87-78
dated July 28, 1 987.
1 93 Tenn . 395, 246 S.W. 2d 59 (1 952)
1 93 Tenn. at 400; State ex reI. Bugbee v. Duke, Te nn, August 29, 1 988. See also
Attorney General 's Opinion U87-78 dated July 28, 1 987 in which the Attorney
General opined that the position of Chairman of the Board of Commissioners and
Chief of Pol ice of the City of Burns were incompatible offices.
Clariday v. State, 552 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 976) ; State v. Prvbil , 2 1 1 N .W.2d
308 (I owa 1 973) .
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VI.

SOURCE AND EXERCISE OF MUN ICIPAL POWERS

Sources of Municipal Powers
General Assembly. Subject to any constitutional provision, the power of
a municipality can be limited at will by the legislature. The classic statement
of the m unicipality's relationship to the state was stated by Judge John F.
Dillon speaking for the I owa Supreme Court in City of Clinton v. Cedar
Rapids and M issouri Railroad Company, 24 I owa 455 ( 1 868) :
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers from,
the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they
cannot exist. As it created, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may
abridge the control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the
right, the legislature might, by a single act, if we can suppose it capable
of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the
municipal corporations of the state, and the corporations could not prevent
it. We know of no limitation on this right so far as the corporations
themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at
will of the legislature.

Tennessee follows the general rule set down by Dillon . Luehrman v. Taxing
District of Shelby County, 70 Tenn. 425 ( 1 879) ; Smiddy v. City of Memphis,
1 40 Ten n . 97 ( 1 91 8) ; Barnes v. City of Dayton, 2 1 6 Tenn. 400 ( 1 964) . In
Smiddy v. City of Memphis, the Su preme Court of Tennessee held that
sim ply because the leg islature conferred upon a municipality a particular
right at some time did not mean that right was vested in the municipality;
the legislatu re cou ld take it away at will. What the legislature giveth, the
legislature can taketh away.
2 M c Q u i llin, Mu niCipal Corporations Section 4.04, p. 1 5- 1 6 (3d Ed. 1 988)
provides as follows :
In accordance with the settled doctrine that muniCipal corporations of all
kinds, including incorporated cities, towns, vii/ages and boroughs, are
creatures, agencies, instrumentalities, departments, auxiliaries, orpolitically
subordinate subdivisions of the state government, the legislature, unless
restrained by the constitution, in conferring powers and imposing
obligations on municipal corporations, may within its discretion designate
limitations thereon.

Dillon's Rule

Judge Dillon did n't stop with saying that municipal corporations are "mere
tenants at will of the legislature," he also set out what is known as Dillon's
�

B..ule :
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possess and can exercise the following powers, and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily

27

or fairly implied In or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those
essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair,
reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is
resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.
Dillon, Law of Municipal Corporations. 448-449 (5th Ed. 19 1 1).

U nder the criminal and other branches of the law one can do what is not
prohibited. However, under municipal law, a municipality can do only what
it is permitted to do. The municipality seeking to take some action must find
a g rant of power someplace in the state constitution or from the state
legislature which permits it to act. Where does it find those powers?
(1) Those granted in express words.

(2) Those powers implied in the express grant.
(3) Those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects
and purposes of the corporation .

Dillon's Rule also provides that the courts will resolve any "fa.ir, reasonable,
substantial doubt concerning the existence of the power" against the
mu nicipality.
Delegated Powers

Dillon's Rule is no cause to board up city hall and g o home. M u nicipalities
have been around for a long time since Dillon uttered his famous rule.
N umerous powers, express, implied , and essential, have been delegated to
cities and towns. Among those powers are the following :
Part of the Police Power of the State
Condemnation of Property
Creation of Municipal Officers
Enactment of Ordinances
Establishment of Hospitals and Other Public Health I nstitutions
Municipal Ownership of Public Utilities
Special Assessments and Bond Issues
Creation, Regulation and Control of Streets and Other Public Ways
and Places
Taxation
Enactment of Building and Similar Codes
Public Improvements
Zoning
I nterlocal Agreements
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The Police Powers

Among the above-mentioned powers, the police power is particularly
important because it is extremely broad and is the basis for most municipal
regulation of business and industry.
What is the police power? No mention of it is found in the Tennessee
Constitution and it is apparently mentioned in no other state constitution.
It is inherent in the state.
The police power has been defined as follows :
The police power is not susceptible of exact definition, there should,
indeed, be no specific definition of it, and in truth, the extent of the power
has never been defined with precision. The power knows no definite
limitations, since in its widest sense it is the power "to govern men and
things. . : The police power is dynamic in character. . .it must be
considerably elastic within limits in order to offset the changing and
shifting conditions which, from time to time arise through the increase
and shift of population and the flex and complexity of commercial and
social relations . . . {The Police Power] is the broadest of government powers
since it is the government Dower over all matters affecting the peace.
order. health. morals. convenience. comfort. and safety of citizens and
other subjects. It is the power to establish social order, to protect the life
and health of persons, to secure their existence and comfort and to
safeguard them in their employment of private and social life and the
beneficial use of property. (Emphasis added) 6A McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations Section 24. 03, p. 14- 15, Section 24. 04 pp. 1 7- 1 8 (3d Ed.
1988).

The Supreme Court in Porter v. City of Paris, 1 54 Tenn . 556 (1 947), when
presented with a challenge to the installation of parking meters on the
grounds that their instal lation was a municipal tax not authorized by the city
charter and against public policy, held as follows :
The police power of a state or a municipality as an arm of the state,
extends to the making of such laws and ordinances as are necessary to
secure the safety, health, good order, peace, comfort, protection and
convenience of the state or municipality.

But as broad as the police power is, it has lirrlits . In H & L Messengers. Inc.
v. City of Brentwood, 577 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn. 1 979), the Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that an ordinance violated both the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and Article 1 , Section 1 9 of the Tennessee
Constitution because it unduly restricted the distribution of handbills within
the city. The city had a uniform city manager commission charter, which
authorized the city :
To define, prohibit, abate, suppress, prevent, and regulate all acts,
practices, conduct, businesses, occupations, callings, trades, use of
property, and all other things whatsoever detrimental. or liable to be
detrimental. to the health. morals. comfort. safety. convenience. or welfare
of the inhabitants of the city and to exercise general Dolice Dowers.
(Emphasis added)
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The court said that liThe right to exercise the police power is an attribute of
sovereignity, necessary to protect the public safety, health, morals and
welfare, and is of vast and undefined extent. In exercising this right.
municipalities have wide discretion and broad powers. " (Emphasis added) .
Regulating litter on city streets and in public places is a permissible and
public purpose and an ordinance to accomplish that objective furthers an
important governmental interest, said the Court, but, "its purpose must be
unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Constitutional guarantees
are superior to the police power.
Exercise of Municipal Powers by Ordinance. Usually anything a city or
town says which is intended to have a continuing or permanent affect or
contains a penalty is spoken by ordinance. According to McQuillin, '1he
passage of an ordinance is, of course, a legislative act, a legislative function
and equivalent to legislative action. McQuillin goes on to say that an
ordinance is of greater dignity than a resolution or motion and "must be
invested, not necessarily literally, but substantially, with the formalities,
solemnities and characteristics of an ordinance as distinguished from a
simple motion or resolution." 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations Section
15.01, p. 34-35, Section 15.02, p. 37-39 (3rd Ed. 1 981 ).
II

Ordinances basically fit into four types:
(1 ) Penal Ordinances. These are ordinances which prescribe certain
rules of conduct and penalty for their violation. The violator may be
brought before the municipal court and, if found guilty of the charge
against rlim/her, may be fined according to the law. The maximum
fine which may be imposed by a municipal court is $50.00. That is
true even if your charter says otherwise.
(2) Adrninistrative Ordinances. These are ordinances which guide and
regulate municipal offices in the conduct and administration of
municipal business. These ordinances may be of long term or
permanent effect such as an ordinance establishing and prescribing
rules for the operation of the municipa.l court, or they may be
temporary, such as an ordinance authorizing the mayor to execute
a contract for the sale of certain city property.
(3) Franchise Ordinances. These are ordinances which grant special
privileges within the municipality, such as a cable television franchise .
(4) Improvement Ordinances. These are ordinances which authorize
and specify the terms of financing for public improvements of various
kinds.
5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations Section 15.09, p. 60 (3rd Ed.

1981) .
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An ordinance. and not resolution or a motion. is used to establish rules and
regulations. the violation of which carries a fine or a penalty. An ordinance
must also be used where the charter or general law requires it. Ordinances
are always in writing. According to McQuillin, "an ordinance must be
reduced to writing before action to pass it can occur; the legislative will can
be expressed in no other manner. 5 McQuillin, Municipa,1 Corporations
Section 1 6. 1 1 , p. 1 37 (3d Ed. 1 98 1 ) .
II

There is no general law i n Tennessee establishing procedu res for enacting
ordinances ; each city or town must look to its own charter for the
procedure. If the charter is silent on that subject, McQuillin says that no
particular formality needs to be adopted to enact an ordinance. McQuillin
continues that where no form is prescribed " . . . any form which clearly
signifies the corporate will that the ordinance or by-law be enacted, exists
or will become effective on a certain date and that plainly indicates what the
terms and objects of the ordinance suffices. 5 McQuillin, Mun icipal
Corporations Section 1 6. 1 1 , p. 1 37 (3rd Ed. 1 98 1 ) .
II

However, most charters prescribe the procedure for enacting ordinances
and a few even prescribe the form to some extent. If a procedure for an
ordinance is prescribed , substantial compliance with the procedure is
required. An ordinance not signed by the mayor as prescribed by the
charter was declared invalid by the Supreme Cou rt of Tennessee in
Memphis Street Ry. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co. , 1 38 Ten n . 594 ( 1 9 1 7) . A
zoning ordinance was held invalid by the same court i n Lightman v. City of
Nashville, 1 66 Ten n . 1 9 1 ( 1 932) , because the city failed to hold a public
heari ng and obtain a report from the Zoning Commission prior to passing
the ordinance as was required by charter. In City of Lebanon v. Baird , 756
S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. 1 988) , the Supreme Court of Tennessee refused to
enforce a contract which had not been adopted in compliance with the
charter of the City of Lebanon.
The city or town must also find authority to support the ordinance. To find
that authority one must refer to the charter and to the general laws.
Remember that the authority does not have to be express ; it may be implied
authority or authority essential to the objects and purposes of the municipal
corporation.
Ordinances cannot conflict with the Constitution of the United States, the
Tennessee Constitution or general law or be repug nant to the general policy
of the state. In H & L M essengers. I nc. v. City of Brentwood , 577 S.W. 2d
444 (Tenn. 1 979) , the Supreme Court of Ten nessee i nvalidated an
ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills i n certain places on the
premise that it violated both the free speech provisions of the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the U nited States and Article I , Section
1 9, of the Tennessee Constitution .
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee resolved a conflict between state
statutes designed to help remove obstacles to handicapped people living i n
family-like settings and a local zoning ord inance i n favor of t h e state
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statutes.
In N ichols v. Tullahoma Open Door. Inc. , 640 S.W.2d 1 3
(Tenn.Ct.App. 1 982) the court was required to interpret Tennessee Code
Annotated Section 1 3-24-1 02, which provided that for the purposes of any
zoning law in Ten nessee, the classification "single-family residence" wou ld
include any home i n which eight or less unrelated mentally retarded or
mentally or physically handicapped people and up to two houseparents or
guardians resided , and Tennessee Code Annotated Section 1 3-24- 1 03,
which provided that Ten nessee Code Annotated Section 1 3-24-1 02 took
precedence over any local zoning ordinance or l aw to the contrary. The
city's zoning ordinance permitted single family dwellings in R-1 residential
districts, and defined a family as "one or more persons occu pying a single
dwelling unit, provided that unless all members are related of blood or
marriage, no such family shall contain over five (5) persons . . . "
The plaintiffs argued that the leg islature i n passing the statutes in question ,
usurped local zoning powers. To that argument the Court responded :
We reject this contention, however, for the reason that municipalities in
Tennessee have no authority other than that granted by the legislature and
the legislature may remove or alter that authority as it chooses. It is
elementary that statutes prescribing how delegated police power may be
exercised by municipalities are mandatory and exclusive. Municipal
authorities cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of state laws
or are repugnant to the general policy of the state.

An interesting aspect of this case from a po lice powers stand point is an
arg ument used by the plaintiffs that the statutes in question violated the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the U nited States
and Article 1 , Section 8 of the Ten nessee Constitution which prohibit, in
almost identical terms, the taking of life, liberty and property without due
process of law. The plaintiffs were residents in the R- 1 district i n which the
home for handicapped people was located , and no doubt their property
values were reduced as a result. They argued that the reduction in the
val ue of their property stemmed from the statutes and represented an
arbitrary and capricious taking of their property .
The Court rejected that argument as follows :
The public powers of the legislature include the power to restrict the use
of private property and to cause diminution of its value so long as the
legislative measures are reasonably related to protecting the public health,
safety, comfort, welfare and morals.
The legislature may impose any limitation upon the use of property which
it may deem necessary or expedient to promote and protect the safety,
health, morals, comfort and welfare of the people, provided only that the
power shall not be exercised arbitrarily; that is, without reasonable
connection or relation between the limitation imposed and the public
safety, health or welfare.-. . .

The court concluded that the integration of physically and mentally
handicapped people into society was a reasonable exercise of the
legislature's police power.
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This case illustrates once again that the police power belongs to the state
and is extremely broad . It may be delegated to a city or town but it resides
in the state. The state may exercise it as well as delegate it, and the state's
exercise may limit municipal authority. Its exercise may also diminish
property values and otherwise interfere with and restrict the use of property.
This is true even when a municipality exercises its delegated police powers.
In M iller v. City of Memphis, 1 8 1 Tenn. 1 5 (1 943) the court upheld a
challenge to a city's reg ulation of juke boxes which the city based on a
charter provision giving the board of commissioners the "authority to
prohibit and regulate by ordinance the making of unnecessary noises . . . of
any automobile . . . bus . . . or by any radio, phonograph, musical instrument, or
other sound devices . . . " The fact that the charter provision did not mention
juke boxes did not bother the Court, which held that:
A municipality has no inherent authority to enact ordinances whose validity
and enforcement rests upon general police powers. All powers of a
municipality are derived from the State, but it cannot be doubted that the
State may delegate its authority, or some portion of it. the police power
primarily inheres in the state, but if the state constitution does not forbid,
the legislature may delegate a part of such power to the municipal
corporations of the state, either in express terms or by implication. . .

A case which illustrates authority essential to the objects a n d pu rposes of
the municipal corporation is Penn-Dixie Cement Corporation v. Kingsport,
1 89 Tenn . 450 ( 1 949) . That case involved the right of a municipality to
enact an ordinance for the abatement of smoke and dust from
manufacturing plants. A state statute gave cities and towns authority as
fol lows :
To define, prohibit, abate, suppress, prevent, and regulate all acts,
practices, conduct, business, occupations, callings, trades, uses of
property and all other things whatsoever detrimental, or liable to be
detrimental, to the health, morals, comfort, safety, convenience or welfare
of the inhabitants of the city, and to exercise general police powers.
Limit occupations liable to become a nuisance. To prescribe limits within
which business occupations and practices are liable to be nuisances or
detrimental to the health, morals, security or general welfare of the people
may be lawfully established, conducted or maintained.

The Court declared that these general law provisions were part of the city's
charter (which contained simi lar provisions) .
The plaintiff arg ued that because neither the city's charter nor the general
law expressly gave the city the authority to abate smoke and dust, the city's
ordinance was void . The Court agreed , hold ing that (a) "mun icipality has
no inherent authority to enact ordinances whose validity rests upon general
police powers, but that power can be implied, "where it is essential to the
objects and purposes of a municipal corporation. The court also held that
one of the ch ief purposes of a municipal corporation is the, "protection of
the publi c health and safety of its inhabitants".
II

II
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There must be a reasonable connection between the limitations imposed by
the ordinance and its purpose. In H & L Messengers. Inc. v City of
Brentwood, 577 S.W. 2d 444 (Tenn. 1 979), the court was concerned that the
purpose of the ordinance in question was to prevent littering, but while it
prohibited the distribution of commercial handbills, it exempted the
distribution of political and religious material. The Court observed that :
With respect to each of these sections containing exemptions in favor of
ideological speech, we point out that it is indisputably true that religious
tracts or political leaflets cast upon a citizen's property constitutes litter to
precisely the same extent as circulars advertising groceries.
The
exemption not only destroys the indispensable content neutrality of the
ordinance, but leaves it standing upon a precarious position from a
standpoint of its purposes. (Emphasis added)

All ordinances must be examined in that light. Look with extreme care at
exemptions from the application of the ordinance which leave in existence
the same problem you seek to eliminate.
Ordinances must be definite and certain. Fortunately, definite and certain
sometimes means something different than good draftsmanship . Poor
ordinance draftsmanship is common in Tennessee and elsewhere, but the
issue is not necessarily whether the ordinance is poorly drafted but whether
it is definite and certain enough to give those affected by it notice of what
limitations it imposes and that it is in operation. However, it is almost
unnecessary t o say that poor ordinance draftsmanship and the lack of
ordinance clarity frequently go hand in hand.
Definitiveness and certainty is particularly important in the drafting of penal
ordinances and ordinances which impose a tax or a licensing requirement.
Ambiguous penal ordinances or ordinances which impose a tax or a
licenSing requirement are construed against the city. In City of Kingsport v.
Jones, 1 96 Tenn. 544 (1 953), the Supreme Court of Tennessee interpreted
an ordinance which made it, lIunlawful for any person, firm or corporation to
transport, sell, store, distribute, receive or possess for sale within the City
and/or manufacture beer.. . within the City... " The Court held that the
ordinance did not make it unlawful to store beer within the city for sale
outside the city ! The Court concluded as follows : "A penal statute or
ordinance will not be enlarged by implication or intendment beyond the fair
meaning of the language used, and will not be held to include these
offenses other than those which are already described ."
An ordinance in City of Greenfield v. Collins, 1 95 Tenn. 285 (1 953), imposed
a vehicle license fee in the following language:
Every person, a resident--of the city, who owns or operates a motor vehicle
In the city, and, every person a non-resident who comes regularly within
the city in pursuit of some business or occupation and who operates
regularly within the city in pursuit of some business or occupation and who
operates regularly an automobile or other motor vehicle within the
city. . . shall, within five days after receiving a state license and number for
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operating the motor vehicle, under the laws of the State of Tennessee, or
within five days after he shall begin such operation, annually register tJ§.
motor vehicle with the city clerk, giving the name of the car, ... and for such
registration, stJall pay an annual fee of $3.00. (Emphasis added)
:-'

A woman who was charged with violating the ordinance lived in the county
outside the corporate limits but had a job in the city and drove there
everyday in an automobile owned and licensed in the name of her husband.
It was in his car that she was cited for failing to have a vehicle license.
The cou rt held that the woman had not violated the ordinance because the
phrase "his motor vehicle" in the ordinance restricted its application to the
owners of motor vehicles . Then the Court went on to say that:
Clearly, if it had been the legislative intent to extend the operation of
automobiles . . . city council would have used appropriate language to effect
that result and would have employed the phrase -rhe motor vehicle. ·
(Emphasis added)

Resolutions

Resolutions are not ordinances. Unless there is some express requirement
otherwise, they are usually less solemn and formal than ordinances. As
might be expected then , they usually need to be in no particular form ,
although virtually all of them are written. Resolutions usually are not subject
to the same procedu ral requirements as ordi nances; they do not have to be
passed on a certain nu mber of read ings, be signed by the mayor, be
passed over a mayor's veto, or be pu blished in order to become effective
unless, of course, the charter or a general law requires otherwise.
Resolutions are not legislative acts ; they speak the "opinion or mind" of the
municipal governing body on a subject or issue before it. They are not
used to establish rules and regu lations, the violation of which carries a fine
or penalty .
However, be carefu l on this pOint! Resolutions may create rig hts in people
against the municipality and against municipal officials as i ndividuals. For
example, many municipalities have personnel policies and proced ures
established by resolution ; perfectly acceptable unless the charter or general
law provides otherwise. Those resolutions do not make municipal officials
subject to a fine if they fail to obey those personnel policies and
procedures. But, those policies and procedures may create rig hts in
municipal employees, and the failure of the mu nicipality and municipal
officials to observe these rights may subject both the municipality and the
mu nicipal officials as individuals to liability under various laws. Do not
presume that a resol ution , because it is a resolution and not an ordi nance,
does not create rig hts and liabilities.
Generally, resolutions can be used for all municipal actions unless the
charter or general laws prescribes the contemplated action be done by
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ordinance. If an ordinance is prescribed by the charter or general law, a
resol ution is not legally sufficient. If in doubt, act by ordinance .
Motions

A motion is usually less forma.l than either an ordinance or resolution .
Genera"y, it relates to the doing of one thing, and when that one thing i s
done, the motion has n o further effect. For example, a motion t o pay
Podunk Motors $2,387.00 for a used dump truck purchased by the Town
of Turtle Creek, has no further effect than authorizing the payment of that
amount of money to that business. Most motions are not written and
require no particular form or procedure to make them effective except their
approval by the municipal governing body.
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VII.

LIABILITY PROBLEMS

Municipal Liability
Ten n essee G overn mental Tort Liability Act.1 Prior to 1 973, Tennessee

mu nicipalities were subject to the state's sovereign immunity for
governmental acts, but could be held liable for proprietary acts.
Govern mental acts were those activities that were peculiar to governments,
or activities only governments could provide, such as police protection , fire
protection, education , or tax collection. Proprietary activities were those that
could be provided by private as well as governmental entities, such as water
and sewer service, electrical services, and mass transit. In 1 973, the
Tennessee General Assem bly enacted the Tennessee Govern mental Tort
Liability Act (29-20- 1 0 1 et seq.) which provides that a municipality is immune
from all suits arising out of its activities, either governmental or proprietary,
unless immunity is specifically removed by the Tennessee Governmental
Tort Liability Act. Federal law may preempt such immunity and state
statutes cannot exempt local governments and officials from liability under
federal causes of action .
Areas in which the act removes governmental immunity are:
1.

claims arising from the negligent operation of motor vehicles ;

2.

claims arising from negligently constructing or maintaining streets ,
alleys, or sidewalks ;

3.

claims arising from the negligent construction or maintenan ce of
public im provements ; and

4.

claims arising from the neg ligence of municipal employees.

There are still further exceptions to these areas where immunity is removed .
These are activities for which the govern ment retains immunity and include :
1.

claims ariSing from the exercise of discretion by a municipal
em ployee , even if this discretion is abused ;

2.

claims arising out of false imprisonment, malicious prosecution ,
intentional trespass , abuse of process , libel , slander, deceit,
interference with contractual rights, infliction of emotional distress,
invasion of privacy, and violation of civil rights;

3.

claims arising out of the issuance of permits or licenses or the failure
to issue such permits or licenses ;

4.

claims arising from the failure to ins pect, or negligent inspection ;
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5.

claims arising from the institution of judicial or administrative
proceedings;

6.

claims arising from negligent or intentional misrepresentation ;

7.

claims arising from mob actions or riots; and

8.

claims arisi ng from the assessment or collection of taxes .

The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act provides certain liability limits
which limit the municipalities' potential liability, which are the greater of (a)
the municipality's insurance limits or (b) the following amounts :
1.

Personal Injury in a Non-Automobile Case :

2.

Property Damage in a Non-Automobile Case : $ 20 ,000

3.

Personal Injury in an Automobile Case :

$350,000

4.

Property Damage in an Automobile Case :

$ 50 ,000

$ 1 30 ,000

The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act provides that in cases where
the municipality is l iable, the municipal employees are immune. In situations
where the municipality is immune under the Ten nessee Governmental Tort
Liabi lity Act, the municipal employee will have the liability limits set fo rth
above , except for medical malpractice clauses.
Non-Tort Liabil ity U nder State Law. The Tennessee Governmental Tort

Liability Act does not apply to worker's compensation actions, inverse
condemnation, breach of contract actions, and other non-tort actions.
M unicipalities and mun icipal officers still remain liable, and the liability limits
of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act have no applicability to
these actions.
Worker's Compensation. Worker's compensation is a statutory scheme
for compensating employees who suffer injuries in the scope of their
employment. This scheme uses a sched ule of determined amounts for
particular types of injuries. M unicipalities may exempt themselves fro m
providing worker's compensation benefits pursuant to this statutory scheme
(50-6-1 06) , but the liability statu,s of a municipality so opting when faced with
a claim by an injured employee suffered in the scope of employment has
not been clearly established by the courts. 3
2

Inverse Condem nation . I nverse condemnation or reverse condemnation

actions are authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29- 1 6- 1 23 to
provide a remedy for property owners whose property is taken by a
municipality for a public purposes without the property owner receiving just
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compensation. The extent of liability in such an action would be the fair
market value taken by the municipality plus any incidental damages incurred
by the property owner.
M unicipalities are responsible for the breach of a
contract entered into by the municipality as would any private individual.
The extent of liability in such a contract action would depend on the terms
of the contract and the damages suffe red by the parties. Also the
municipality could be required by a court to perfo rm according to the terms
of the contract.
Breach of Contract.

There are other non-tort areas of liability for municipalities such as public
records violations, open meetings violations and numerous others . You r
city attorney should b e consulted anytime issues concerning any of these
matters should arise.
Federal Rig hts of Actions. Except for the limited protection provided by
the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, federal
law overrides, or preempts, state law. Federal causes of action are based
on the Constitution of the U nited States or its amendments, or various
federal statutes. Actions based on 42 U .S.C. § 1 983 or federal civil rights
actions, can now be brought in state court.

Any action , including hiring, firing, awarding contracts, promotions, or other
actions similar in nature, which are motivated by discriminatory intent or
which have discriminatory effect, or which deprive a person of due process
of law must be carefully avoided by municipal officials as they open the door
for the municipality and munici pal officials to be held liable based on the
Constitution of the United States and various federal statutes.
Personal Liab ility

There are several areas, including various federal and state actions, where
a m unicipal official could be held personally liable. Some actions have a
good faith defense and others do not. Under present state law, employees
are totally immune when the municipality is liable under the Tennessee
Governmental Tort Liability Act, except for medical malpractice claims,
u nless the act or omission was willful, malicious, criminal, or performed for
personal financial gain. I n situations where the municipality is immune, the
municipal employee's liability is limited to that of the municipality as
explained above.
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.1

Pivnick, Tenn. Circuit Court Prac.
2
3

4

(2nd Ed . ) Section 32 ( 1 986) .

Title 50, Chapter 6, Tennessee Code Annotated.
Attorney General's Opinion 86-1 1 3 dated June 24, 1 986, provides that the
municipal ity would be liable
for such a claim under the Tennessee Governmental
.
Tort Liabil ity Act.
Pol ing v. Goins, 71 3 S .W.2d 305 (Tenn . 1 986) .
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VIII.

MISCE LLANEOUS ISSUES

.'

Open Records

All records of the offices of the municipality are open to the public for public
inspection and copying u nless specifically made confidential by statute
( 1 0-7-503) . If a municipal official refuses to allow members of the public
access to any record which is a public record, the person so denied access
can file a petition in the chancery court to obtain access to these records
( 1 0-7-505) .
A recent amendment to the Open Records Act provides that a party who is
wrongfully denied access to the public records and who obtains access to
the records by order of the chancery cou rt can recover his or her attorney's
fees from the municipal ity. This amendment was adopted to prevent
municipal officials from refusing access to public records except when
ordered to grant access by the chancery court. Such a practice can now
result in significant financial liability to the municipality.
Dispos ition of Records

A large number of records are req uired to be maintai ned by municipal
officials , and therefore, storage problems usually occur which require
municipal officials to seek a method to dispose of old and obsolete records.
Since many of the records mai ntained by the many rTlunicipal officials are
historically significant, great care must be taken in the storage and/or
disposition of old or less frequently util ized records.
I n recognition of the problems that municipalities encounter with records
disposition , the General Assembly has created a statutory framework for the
storage or disposition of municipal records ( 1 0-7-40 1 et seq) . Each county
is required to establish a County Public Records Commission to oversee the
storage or disposal process for a.1 I public records, including municipal
records, as original permanent records which have been reproduced or
microfilmed can not be legally destroyed without approval of the Com mission
( 1 0-7-404) . After the County Public Records Commission approves of the
disposition of municipal records , the municipal legislative body must concur
in the d isposition of the records ( 1 0-7-405) .
Sunsh ine Act

The Sunshine or Open Meeti ngs Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section
8-44-1 01 , et seg. , requires that all legislative body meetings or meetings of
any governing body be open to the public. When the body holds its regu lar
meetings or special meetings, it must give adequate notice to the public of
those meetings.
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"Governing body" is defined by the open meetings law as ''the members of
any public body which consists of two or more members with authority to
make decisions or recommendations to a public body on policy or
administration. "Meeting" is defined as ''the convening of a governing body
of a public body for which a quorum is required in order to make decisions
or to deliberate toward decisions on any matter.
II

II

In Fain v. Faculty of College of Law of Univ. of Tennessee, 552 S.W.2d 752
(Tenn . Ct.App. 1 977) , the Court of Appeals of Tennessee held that a
committee of faculty members and students created to assist the dean in
decision-making did not constitute a "govern ing body" pursuant to the
Sunshine Act because such a committee made recommendations to the
dean as opposed to any public body.
The requirements for "adequate public notice" are not specified in the law,
and the courts have interpreted that requirement to require such notice
based on the totality of the circumstances as would fairly inform the pUblic. 1
In Bilbury v Burgess, Tenn. App. , Mid. Section, April 1 , 1 977, the court
upheld the posting of a sign in the window of the city recorder's office of an
emergency meeti ng of the Board of Aldermen later that same afternoon
when the newspapers in the county attended the meeting and witnesses
testified that they had observed the sign in the window of the recorder's
office.
As a general rule, the more formal the meeting, the more stringent the
notice requirements. For example, a committee meeting of three munici pal
legislative body members meeting to form ulate a recommendation on a
minor city decision may obtain "adequate public notice" by sim ply posting
notice of their meeting in public places, while a meeting of the city budget
committee might achieve "adequate public notice" only through newspaper
publication . Common sense is the best rule when attempting to determine
the form of adequate public notice for a meeting.
There had been considerable controversy concerning the definition of a
meeting, and whether a quoru m is required , and other questions about
what type of meeting must be open to the public. A narrow exception has
been judicially established regarding discussions concerning pending
l itigation with the county attorney.2
Federal Fa ir La bor Sta ndards Act

On February 1 9, 1 985, the United States Su preme Cou rt, in Garcia v. San
Antonio Transit Authority , overruled the National League of Cities v. Usery
case decided in 1 976, and held that the provisions of the Federal Fai r Labor
Standards Act, 29 U . S.C. 201 et seq. , hereinafter "FLSA", are applicable to
state and local government employees. 3 On November 1 9, 1 985, Cong ress
responded to the Garcia case by passing the Fair Labor Standards Act
Amendments of 1 985, which had the effect of granting local governments
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a grace period u ntil April 1 5, 1 986, from application of the overtime
provisions of the FLSA. The amendments also made special provisions for
compensatory time used by local government employees and made other
significant changes.
The grace period has now expired , and the
mu nicipalities of Tennessee and other states must be in full compliance with
the amended provisions of the FLSA, including minimum wage, overtime
and recordkeeping provisions. The Department of Labor has issued
regulations that are to be used in interpreting the amendments and the
FLSA's applicability to municipalities."
The FLSA requires that the minirrlum wage be paid to all employees,
regulates the employment of minors, requires that employers keep certain
records, and requires overtime pay for covered employees. The FLSA does
not req uire vacation, holiday, severance, or sick pay, does not req uire meal
or rest periods, holidays off, or vacation time off, does not limit the number
of hours an employee over 16 years of age may work (it only req uires
overtime compensation for covered employees) , does not require premium
pay for weekend or holiday work, does not require pay raises or fringe
benefits, and does not require a discharge notice, reasons for discharge, or
immediate payment of final wages.
M u nicipal officials must consider FLSA implications on personnel decisions
and work in cooperation with the municipal legislative body to implement
policies and agreements with the employees to meet the requirements of
the FLSA so as to uti lize the provisions that require affirmative policies, such
as com pensatory time, if desirable.
Exem ptions. The sirrlple payment of a salary in lieu of an hourly wage has
no bearing on whether an employee is exempt from the provisions of the
FLSA. However, there are certain persons to whom the provisions of the
FLSA do not apply. These include true "independent contractors".

There are also other employees who are exe mpt from the overtime
provisions. Among others not noted here, these exemptions include:
1.

Elected pub lic officials, who are not subject to civil service laws of the
state , county or agency.

2.

"White collar" exemptions, including executive, administrative, or
professional employees.

3.

Volu nteers who may receive nominal pay and actual expenses .

4.

Seasonal employees .

White Co l l a r Exem ptions. - The "white collar" exemptions mentioned above

provide a "safe harbor" test, or short test, for employees receiving a salary
of greater than $250 per week. For an executive employee meeting this
salary requirement to be exempt, the employee's duties must primarily
consist of the management of the em ploying enterprise or a recognized
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department thereof, with two or more full time employees under that
employee's direction . To meet the administrative exemption, the same
salary threshold applies and the employee's duties must primarily consist
of the performance of office or non-manual work directly relating to the
management or operation of the employing enterprise, or performance of
administrative functions, or teaching in an educational establishment, and
the employee rnust regularly exercise discretion and independent
judgement.
The tests for meeting these "white collar" exemptions for employees who do
not meet the salary threshold still requ ire a minimum salary of $ 1 55 per
week and more stringent tests regarding duties.
Compensable Hours . The statutory definition of the term "employ" u nder

the FLSA is Uto suffer or permit to workll. Compensable hours of work
include all times during which the employee is on duty or on the employer's
premises under conditions which prevent the employee from using the time
for personal activities. Work not requested or required by the employer, but
allowed or permitted , is work time under the FLSA, even if performed away
from the premises or the job site, or even at home. If the employer knows
or has reason to believe that work is being performed , the work must be
counted as hours worked.
Generally, periods during which an employee is completely
relieved from duty and which are long enough to enable the employee to
use the time effectively for his or her own purposes are not hours worked .
Rest periods of short duration, ru nning from 5 minutes to about 20 minutes,
must be counted as hours worked. Meal periods of at least 30 minutes or
more, where an employee is completely relieved from d uty, are not included
as hours worked . It is not necessary that an employee be permitted to
leave the premises during a meal period, so long as he or she is otherwise
completely freed from duties.
Breaks .

Minimum Wage Provisions . Every covered, non-exempt employee is
entitled to a minimum wage of not less than $3.35 per hour for every hour
worked . An employee may be paid on a weekly, monthly, or some other
basis. If an employee is paid on a weekly basis but works fluctuating hours,
compliance with the minimum wage requirements will be determined by
dividing the weekly wage by the number of hours worked in a particular
week.
Deductions.
Deductions made from wages for such items as cash
shortages may not reduce the wages of employees below the minimum
wage or cut into overtime compensation required by the FLSA. Likewise,
deductions made from wages to fund mandatory retirement and insurance
plans cannot reduce the wages of an employee below the minimum wage .
I f a n insurance or retirement plan is completely voluntary o n t h e part of the
employee, then the deductions can be made regardless of the fact that
such deduction wil l reduce the wage to below the required minimum hourly
wage.

44

Overtime. The FLSA requires that overtime must be paid for hours worked
over 40 in a week. This requirement may not be waived by any agreement
between the employer and employees. An announcement by the employer
that no overtime work will be permitted, or that overtime work will not be
paid for unless authorized in advance, will not limit the employer's liability for
the overtime work which the employer ·suffe rs or permits" employees to
work over 40 hours per week. The FLSA generally requires that municipal
employees who work overtime be paid time and one-half for all hours in
excess of 40 by their employer.
Compensatory Time. Employees of a municipality may receive, in lieu of

overtime compensation , compensatory time (comp time) off at a rate not
less than one and one-half hours for each hour of overtime pursuant to an
agreement or understanding . The regular practice in effect on April 1 5,
1986, with respect to comp time shall constitute the understanding and
remain in effect (in noncollective bargaining situations) . New employees
should be given notice of the practice. The employer can use a
combination of comp time and wages so long as the time-and-a-half
requirement is met.
There are limits to the amount of comp time which may accrue or be
"bankedll• After the maximum number of hours has accrued, the employee
must be paid overtime compensation.
If compensation is paid to an employee for
accrued comp time, such compensation is paid at the regular rate earned
by the employee at the time the employee receives such payment. An
employee who has accrued comp time upon termination of employment is
paid the greater of:
Payment for Comp Ti me.

( 1 ) the average regular rate the employee received during the last 3
years, or

(2) the final regular rate of pay received by the employee.
Lim itations on the Use of Cam p TIme. An employee who has requested

the use of accrued comp time must be permrtted to use such time within a
reasonable period after making the request, if the use does not unduly
disrupt the operations of the municipality.
Calculating Overtime Pay. Overtime pay is calculated by multiplying the
employee's "regular rate of pay" by one and one-half times the number of
overtime hours worked. The regular rate is defined as the rate per hour
paid for normal non-overtime work. In cases in which the employee is paid
on a weekly basis, the regular rate is determined by dividing the weekly
salary by the number of hours in the employee's regular workweek.
Payments which are not part of the regular rate include reimbursement for
expenses incurred on the employer's behalf, premium payments for
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overtime work and the premium portion that is not less than time and
one-half the regular rate paid for work on Saturdays, Sundays, and
holidays ; and payments for occasional periods when no work is performed
due to vacation, holidays, or illness.
The FLSA does not require employers to pay employees on an hourly rate
basis.
Their earnings may be determined on a daily rate , s a l a ry,
commission, or some other basis, but in such case the overtime pay due
must be computed on the basis of the hourly rate derived from such
earnings. The regular hourly rate of pay of an employee is determined by
dividing the total remuneration for employment (except the statutory
exclusions) in any workweek by the total number of hours actually worked
in the workweek.

If an employee is employed solely on the basis of a single hourly rate, the
hourly rate is the "regular rate". For overtime hours, the employees must be
paid , in addition to the straight-time hourly earnings, a sum determined by
multiplying one-half the hourly rate by the number of hours worked over 40
in the week. If, for example, the hourly rate is $4 and an employee works
46 hours in a week, the employee would be entitled to receive $ 1 96 ( 46
hours at $4 plus 6 hours at $2) , or stated another way, 40 hours time $4
plus 6 hours times $6 (time and one-half) .
If an employee is employed solely on a weekly salary basis, the regu lar
hourly rate of pay is computed by dividing the salary by the num ber of
hours which the salary is intended to compensate. For example, if an
employee is hired at a salary of $ 1 64 . 50 and if it is understood that this
salary is com pensation for a regular workweek of 35 hours, or $4.70 an
hour, when overtime is worked the employee is entitled to receive $4.70 for
each of the -first 40 hours and $7.05 (time and one-half) for each hour
thereafter. If an employee is hired at a salary of $ 1 64 for a 40 hou r week
the regular rate is $4. 1 0 an hour.
Where the salary covers a period longer than workweek, such as a month,
it must be reduced to its workweek equivalent. A month ly salary can be
converted to its equivalent weekly wage by multiplying by 1 2 (the number
of months) and dividing by 52 (the number of weeks) . A semi-monthly
salary is converted to its equivalent weekly wage by multiplying by 24 and
dividing by 52.
Fixed Salary for Fluctuating Hours. The FLSA authorizes the payment

of a fixed salary for fluctuating hours . The fixed salary can cover hours in
excess of 40 hours a week, provided the employee has a clear
understanding that the salary constitutes straig ht-time pay for a ll hours
worked and the straight-time pay is eq ua l to or exceeds the req uire d
minimum wage of $3.35 per hour.
The regular rate of an employee whose hours of work -fluctuate from week
to week, who is paid a fixed salary with the clear understanding that the
salary constitutes straight-time pay for all hours worked , whatever their
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number and whether few or many, will vary from week to week. The regular
rate is obtained for each week by dividing the fixed salary by the n um ber of
hours worked in that week, but cannot, of cou rse, fall below the required
minimum hourly wage in any week. Since straight-time compensation has
already been paid for all hours worked through the fixed salary, the
employee is entitled to receive overtime pay for each hour worked over 40
in the workweek at a rate of not less than one-half this straight-time
compensation.
A fixed salary for a regular workweek longer than 40 hours does not
discharge the statutory obligation of an employer to pay overtime. For
example, an employee may be hired to work a 44-hour workweek for a
weekly salary of $200. I n this instance the regu lar rate is obtained by
dividing the $200 straight-time salary by 44 hours, which results in a regu lar
rate of pay of $4.55. The erTlployee is then due additional overtime
computed by multiplying the 4 overtime hours by one-half the regular rate
of pay ($4.475) or $9. 1 0.
Determination of the Applicable Workweek or Work Period . For reg ular
employees, the maximum number of allowable hours which may be worked
before overtime must be paid is 40 hours per workweek. The workweek,
as defined by the FLSA, is a fixed and regularly recurring period of 1 68
hours or seven consecutive 24-hour periods. The workweek need not
coincide with the calendar week but may begin on any day and at any hour
of the day. A single workweek may be established for all employees, or
different workweek is established , it rema.ins fixed , but may be changed if
the change is intended to be permanent and is not designed to evade the
overtime requirements of the FLSA.

The FLSA requires a single workweek as its standard and does not permit
averaging of hours over two or more weeks. For example , an employee
who works 30 hours one week and 50 hours the next must receive overtime
pay for the hours worked beyond 40 in the second week , even though the
average number of hours worked in the two weeks is 40. This is true
regardless of whether the employee works on a standard or swingshift
schedule and regardless of whether payment is made on a daily, weekly,
bi-weekly, monthly, or other basis.
If a municipal employee
undertakes, on an occasional or sporadic basis and solely at the
employee's option , part-time employment for the rTlunicipality in a different
capacity than the employee's regular employment, hours worked in
performing the different employment do not have to count toward
calculation of overtime hours.
Occasional

or

Sporadic

Employment.

Swapping Time. If a municipality's employees agree, with the approval of
the m unicipal official supervising said employees, but solely at the option of
the employees, to swap scheduled work hours in the same job capacity, the
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hours worked as a substitute do not have to be counted for the calculation
of overtime hours. Employers do not have to keep records of the
substituted work.
Records. There are certain recordkeeping provisions of the FLSA. Each
municipal official responsible for personnel and payroll records should
check to ascertain that all the information required is contained in the
records. Municipal officials must keep records of wages, hours, and other
conditions and practices of errlployment i nvolving his or her employees
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.5 These records should be kept in the
office which acts as the employer. All interested parties have a duty under
federal law to comply with the rules and regulations under the FLSA.
Enforcement and Penalties. Employers who willfu lly violate the minimum

wage or overtime provisions of the FLSA may be fined up to $ 1 0,000, and
if the employer has been convicted on a prior occasion, may also be
imprisoned up to six months. Also, when an employee sues for violation of
the minimum wage or overtime provisions, the employer may have to pay
the unpaid minimum wage or overtime, as well as an equal amount for
liquidated damages, attorney's fees, costs, and other rel ief, such as
promotions and reinstatement. The U . S. Department of Labor may also
initiate legal action against an employer.
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Memphis Publ ishing C o v. City of Memphis, 5 1 3 S.W. 2d 5 1 1 (Tenn. 1 974) ; Bilbrey
Burgess, Tenn. App., Mid. Section, April 1 , 1 977.
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Anderson, 676 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn. 1 984) .
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Smith County Educ. Association
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Garcia V. San Antonio Transit Authority, 1 05 U . S . 2061 (1 985) .
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29 C. F. R. Part 553 ; Federal Register 1 3402-1 342 1 (April 1 8, 1 986) .
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Attorney General's Opinion 85-1 64 dated May 1 7, 1 985.
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The University of Tennessee does not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, color,
religion, national origin, age, handicap, or veteran status in provision of educational
opportunities or employment opportunities and benefits.
The University does not discriminate on the basis of sex or handicap In the
education programs and activities which it operates, pursuant to the requirements
of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1 972, Pub.L 92-31 8; and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1 973, Pub.L 93-1 1 2; respectively. This policy extends
to both employment by and admission to the University.
Inquiries concerning Title IX and Section 504 should be directed to Ms. Mary H.
Taylor, Ass istant to the Vice President, 109 Student Services and Administration
Building, Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-021 2, (61 5)974-6622. Charges of violation
of the above policy should also be directed to Ms. Taylor.

INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
In 1 97 1 , the UT B oard of Trustees created the In stitute for Public S ervice (IPS) to coordinate and
promote public service activities throughout the University system, excluding services provided through the
Institute of Agriculture.
The basic goal of the university public service effort continues to be to bring to the citizens of
Tennessee-their business, their industry, and their government-the problem-solving capabilities uniquely
embodied within their statewide university system.
Public service include s all services offered to those outside the University, including teaching in
certain non-degree situations, technical assistance, and applied research which are conducted specifically
at the request and for the benefit of non-University organi zations in Tennessee.

IPS provides ( 1 ) a systemwide focal point for urban and public service, (2) a means to coordinate the
various system-level public service activities, and (3) an organizational base for communication and
program development that relates to both outside service clientele of the University and the campuses of the
University system.
The operating units of the Institute and their dates of creation are : Center for Government Training

( 1 967), Center for Indu strial Services ( 1 963), County Technical Assistance S ervice ( 1 973), Municipal
Technical Advisory Service ( 1 949), and Center for Telecommunications and Video ( 1 989).

